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Texas court rules on cleanup liability
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An allied trades firm may not be held for
contamination clean-up costs incurred by a cleaner that used
its equipment and services, according to a Texas Supreme Court
decision handed down June
10.
The long-running court battle between
Pilgrim Enterprises of Houston and R. R. Street & Co. Inc.
will continue, however, as the case was remanded by the Supreme
Court to the trial court for further proceedings on other
issues involved in the suit.
The contamination came to light in 1994
when the Robertson family, which had owned Pilgrim Laundry and
Cleaners for nearly 50 years, underwent an environmental
assessment as part of the sale of the business that included a
chain of drycleaning plants in Houston and San Antonio.
Pilgrim spent $7 million on remediation,
then sued Street and several other suppliers of equipment and
chemicals, contending that they were responsible parties under
state law.
The other companies settled, but Street
took the battle to court. In 1998, a jury in a Houston
district court decided in Street’s favor, but the
district court judge ruled that Street was still liable as an
“arranger” for hazardous waste disposal and ordered
the company to pay $1.5 million of Pilgrim’s cleanup
costs.
After hearing an appeal of the district
court ruling, the state court of appeals in 2001 issued a mixed
decision. The court said the case should go back to the lower
court and that a jury should make factual determination
concerning Street’s liability and the judge should
apportion the costs. But it left in tact the portion of the
ruling that made Street’s liable as an
“arranger” for disposal of solid waste.
In last month’s ruling, the Supreme
Court said the lower courts erred in holding Street liable as
an arranger.
“The supplier was not an arranger
subject to potential liability under (the Texas Solid Waste
Disposal Act) based upon its giving advice regarding waste
disposal,” the court said. A Street representative had
told Pilgrim operators that they could dispose of separator
water “the same way everybody else was doing it, pouring
it down the drain,” the court noted. That advice, indeed,
did reflect a common industry practice at the time.
But, the court added, “Street did
not actually control the specific method and manner in which
Pilgrim disposed of the separator water.”
The court said that if providing
technical services and advice were to create an
“arranger” liability, companies would be
discouraged from this type of information.
That portion of the decision was welcomed
by industry allied trades firms. The Textile Care Allied Trades
Association called it “a huge victory for all
manufacturers and distributors in the textile care industry,
especially those that manufacture or distribute hazardous
substances and waste.”
“It would be hard to underestimate
the importance of this court decision. Whether it is a
drycleaning chemical or effluent from a laundry machine, the
precedent set by this ruling touches nearly every distributor
and manufacturer in our industry,” said TCATA president
Bill Odorizzi.
TCATA and the Halogenated Solvents
Industry Alliance had filed a friend of the court brief with
the Texas Supreme Court making those points.
Another area of the case that industry
associations had taken a position on also received favorable
consideration from the Texas court. That issue involved whether
equipment used to recycle perc amounts to “processing of
hazardous waste.” Pilgrim contended that because Street
provided the equipment, the company had “arranged to
process” the waste.
The International Fabricare Institute and
the Southwest Drycleaners Association addressed that issue in a
friend of the court brief filed in 2003, saying that if
recycling perc constituted processing hazardous waste, all
cleaners using perc would become treatment storage or disposal
facilities and face such additional regulations that would
leave them unable to operate.
In rejecting Pilgrim’s argument,
the court noted that EPA has specifically exempted closed loop
recycling processes and even referenced solvents returned for
use as cleaning agents in drycleaning operations.
Another aspect of the case concerned
whether Street was a contributor to the contamination because
its representative had poured waste samples of water containing
perc into sinks and toilets at Pilgrim properties. On visits to
Pilgrim facilities, the Street representative conducted
titration tests to determine the detergent concentration. After
testing, the contents of the test vials were disposed into the
waste drains.
Street argued that the mixtures did not
constitute “solid waste” under the domestic sewage
exclusion. Pilgrim contended that the perc in the test samples
leaked through the sewers and contributed to the contamination.
The Supreme Court said there was
conflicting testimony as to whether the sewage pipes leaked at
Pilgrim’s facilities. “We… hold that a fact
issue exists as to whether the supplier is potentially liable
as an arranger based upon its own disposal of test-vial waste
fluid,” the court said.
“Because there were fact issues
that needed to be resolved as to both liability and damages,
the Court of Appeals erred in failing to remand the SWDA claim
for a new trial,” the Supreme Court concluded.
“Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’
judgment in part and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings.”
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